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Ira C. Lupu and Robert W. Tuttle’s Secular Government, Religious
People1 is one of the very best overviews of the American law of religious
liberty in print. It is an excellent introduction to the subject, and it makes
sense of some tangled areas of doctrine in ways that will enlighten
specialists. Their knowledge of the law is encyclopedic, and they deliver it
with astonishing compression and grace. The chapter on government
funding of religion, which sympathetically reconstructs the rationale of the
now abandoned rule against any funding of religion while exposing its
limitations, is particularly impressive.2
Lupu and Tuttle’s fundamental claim is that religious liberty in
America is founded on a jurisdictional limit upon government competence.3
Government is fundamentally secular: “the nonestablishment principle
defines a government that receives its authority from the people, not from
revealed or transcendent sources, and that recognizes the limited scope of
its authority over the people.”4 They work out the implications of this
principle for both government endorsement of religious propositions and
exemption from generally applicable laws.
A keystone of the book’s argument is its response to an increasingly
salient question: what makes religion special?5 That response has important
implications for religious accommodation. This brief Review will focus on
those issues.
Lupu and Tuttle note but dismiss two prominent answers to the
question of why religion is special, which they call the “authentic choice”
and “civil peace” approaches.6 The first holds that “religion is special
because of its constitutive role in human identity and well-being.”7 The
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second, which arises out of the experience of religious wars, aims to avoid
destructive conflict.8 Both have played a role in shaping doctrine, “[b]ut
neither approach offers a fully convincing explanation of why the concept
of nonestablishment should treat religion as distinctive.”9 Nonreligious
commitments can also play a constitutive role in personal identity, and
nonreligious conflicts can also be a threat to order.10
Instead, they regard religion as an attribute of political authority:
From this perspective, three characteristics of religion present the problem to
which nonestablishment responds. First, religion locates the source of its
authority in a transcendent and eternal being or order, to which all temporal
beings and orders are subject. Second, religion asserts comprehensive
jurisdiction; its competence and authority extend to all dimensions of human
life. And third, the subjects of religious authority respond to it by worship
and submission.11

“Nonestablishment,” they write, “marks a radical break with previous links
between government and all three characteristics of religion.”12
This radical break obviously limits the state’s capacity to claim
transcendent authority, or to decide religious questions. It demands that
laws have secular purposes.
All this makes sense. But, strangely, Lupu and Tuttle say very little
about what motivates the “radical break” they describe. Why are the three
characteristics of religion so bad, from a political perspective? Some of
their formulations suggest that the underlying aim is to prevent the abuse of
government power: “The relationship between government and people is
not one of master and servant, but quite the reverse.”13 But established
religion can be democratically accountable. The people can vote on which
religious propositions the state is going to embrace. The Establishment
Clause presents the same countermajoritarian difficulty as the rest of
constitutional law. One of the most striking effects of allowing legislative
prayer has been that elections have been fought on precisely this basis.14
The missing element of disestablishment, one that gets no discussion
in Lupu and Tuttle, although it had a powerful influence on the Framers
and on the modern Supreme Court, is the idea that religion can be
corrupted and degraded by state support.15 If you think, as James Madison
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and the Warren Court did, that “religion is too personal, too sacred, too
holy, to permit its ‘unhallowed perversion’ by a civil magistrate,”16 then
you will embrace the radical break that Lupu and Tuttle describe.
There is a growing scholarly consensus (I’m a dissenter) that special
treatment of religion cannot be justified. With respect to free exercise,
some think there should never (or almost never) be accommodation,17 while
others think that accommodation is appropriate, but under a different
description; that it is morally arbitrary and unfair to single out religion for
special treatment.18 Disestablishment, too, should not single out religion.
Rather, government should be prohibited from endorsing any
comprehensive view or conception of the good.19
Lupu and Tuttle do not respond to these views. In part that is a
consequence of their strategic decision to focus on the Supreme Court and
ignore most of the scholarly debates. But the Court, too, is uneasy and
inarticulate about the reasons for singling out religion. The operational
meaning of the First Amendment is likely to be different depending on
what underlying purposes are attributed to the Amendment.
Lupu and Tuttle implicitly rely on the undefended premise that
government should not make pronouncements on religious doctrine. (That
premise would make sense in light of the corruption rationale.) This
reliance is clearest in their attack on the rule of Sherbert v. Verner20 and the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, that “Government shall not
substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion even if the burden
results from a rule of general applicability,” unless the Government
“demonstrates that application of the burden to the person—(1) is in
furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least
restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.”21
This rule, they argue, “raises profound questions about (1) the
legitimacy of privileging religiously motivated conduct over its secular
analogues, and (2) the state’s competence to decide the significance of
burdens on religiously motivated behavior.”22 Religion should be protected,
they argue, but under the description of nonreligious rights, such as
freedom of speech and association.23 This approach “makes religionists and
16
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secularists into partners in developing a workable theory of the limited
state.”24 They boldly try to rehabilitate the notion of “hybrid” rights, one of
the most incoherent aspects of the Employment Division v. Smith25 decision,
by construing it as “a reference to situations in which religious freedom is
subsumed in other, more general rights.”26
Yet Lupu and Tuttle are oddly ambivalent. On a single page, they
denounce “exemptions from general laws regulating the conduct of all,”27
but then they accept a 1793 decision allowing Jews to decline to testify on
a Saturday, because “disputes about the relationship between religious
conviction and the calendar . . . do not involve basic norms of right versus
wrong behavior.”28 So not all “general laws regulating the conduct of all”
involve “basic norms of right versus wrong behavior.”29
They declare that their opposition to religion-specific accommodation
is not “limited to the judicial branch,” but “attaches to all branches and all
levels of government.”30 Yet they accept exemptions for “certain religious
groups from rules of road safety or restrictions on the use of controlled
substances,” because “[i]n such situations, the state simply moves out of
the way and allows the religiously motivated practice to proceed.”31 But
these accommodations are, what was rejected elsewhere, “exemptions from
general laws regulating the conduct of all.”32
A ban on legislative accommodation, they argue, would be unfair:
“Because nonreligious practices or groups can seek specific forms of
responsiveness in their favor, a categorical ban on relief that is targeted to
religion would effectively and unjustifiably disfavor religion.”33 But they
also argue that analogies are very hard to evaluate. The possibility of skin
irritation from shaving is not really comparable to the cost of defying
God’s will, and exemption for sacramental wine during Prohibition is not
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necessarily analogous to Native American use of hallucinogens.34 It is hard
to be confident that there is any unfairness.
Lupu and Tuttle’s real objection thus appears to be, not to the practice
of religious accommodation, but to the attempt to codify that practice into a
rule. Legislative accommodation predates the framing of the Constitution,
but the principle of religious accommodation “had never before appeared
in our constitutional law”35 before Sherbert36 in 1963. It is the codification
that demands that courts assess burdens on religion, which in turn demands
evaluation of the centrality of any practice to a religion. However, “secular
government lacks the jurisdictional competence to determine the religious
significance—the substantiality—of the alleged burden.”37 Again, this
argument would be stronger if they provided a clearer account of the basis
for this jurisdictional boundary.
Maybe Lupu and Tuttle are right that the rule will not work. It is still
too early to tell. The Court limited it in all sorts of unprincipled ways
between Sherbert and Smith.38 More recently, in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby
Stores, Inc.,39 the Court lurched far in the other direction, suggesting that it
may even be permissible for a religious group to impose serious harms on
discrete, identifiable nonadherents if courts can imagine some hypothetical,
albeit politically impossible, less restrictive means for achieving the state’s
purpose.40
It is probably possible to do a better job of implementing an
exemption rule than the Court has done. But the core problem Lupu and
Tuttle identify persists: when a burden on religion is claimed, the state’s
lawyer inevitably will argue “that a particular religious practice is trivial, or
nonobligatory, or capable of being replaced by a substitute practice.”41
The problem is a tough one.42 Kent Greenawalt’s exhaustive survey of
the case law concludes that the best judges can hope to do is to “reasonably
comprehend a person’s religious beliefs and practices” and thereby to “be
able to identify some interferences as very great and others as trivial.”43 His
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proposed resolutions of the various types of accommodation issues are
intensely fact-specific. Greenawalt acknowledges concerns “that most
administrators have neither the talent nor the time to scrutinize individual
religious sentiments and that individuals may be less than candid or
genuinely uncertain about what they believe.”44
Judgments about compelling interest are likewise influenced by
assessments of burdens on religion: “In reality, courts consider burden in
light of government interest and government interest in light of burden,
striking a kind of balance.”45 This is a tricky business, and it may be
beyond judges’ competence to do it without smuggling in illegitimate
preferences for familiar religious views. In Greenawalt’s account, the
intensely context-sensitive judgments that ground accommodation
decisions are ultimately inarticulate: “A person who believes that multiple
values bear on the resolution of major social and legal issues . . . may feel
confident about which features matter most and even about particular
overall assessments, without being able to offer a set of abstract principles
to demonstrate the correctness of his judgments.”46 That saves courts from
making expressly religious judgments. Greenawalt suggests that the
practice of religious accommodation can work as a series of ad hoc
judgments.47 He seems ready to trust courts to make these judgments.
Lupu and Tuttle’s preference for the legislature seems to derive, in
part, from the greater opacity of the legislative process, where no rule is
followed and decisions do not have to be accompanied by a reasoned
opinion. Greenawalt thinks that courts can have the same redeeming
opacity.
I cannot say with confidence that Lupu and Tuttle are wrong about
judicial accommodation. I can say that the idea of individual
accommodation has produced gains for individual liberty that were unlikely
to occur in any other way—certainly not by individual acts of legislative
grace or administrative discretion. Consider the application of the Religious

44

Id. at 206.
Id. at 202.
46
Id. at 7. This inarticulateness at the core is understandably a source of frustration for some of
Greenawalt’s readers. See, e.g., Steven D. Smith, Discourse in the Dusk: The Twilight of Religious
Freedom?, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1869, 1871–72 (2009) (reviewing 2 KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGION AND
THE CONSTITUTION: ESTABLISHMENT AND FAIRNESS (2008)) [https://perma.cc/36PD-YMJZ].
47
He writes:
45

No single theory covers everything; multiple reasons typically support a practice and carry
varying weights in different contexts. This reality applies to many particular issues about
government concessions not to perform general duties. Once this is recognized, people should
not expect matters to reduce to a single justification that clearly warrants some exemptions and
does not warrant others . . . .
KENT GREENAWALT, EXEMPTIONS: NECESSARY, JUSTIFIED, OR MISGUIDED? 49 (2016) [hereinafter
EXEMPTIONS]. For further discussion of Greenawalt, see Andrew Koppelman, Kent Greenawalt,
Defender of the Faith, 95 TEX. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) (reviewing EXEMPTIONS).

46

111:41 (2016)

Lupu, Tuttle, and Singling Out Religion

Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act48 to prisons, where it generates
the only prisoner claims that are treated with any respect by the courts.49
Absent a discourse of religious liberty, it is hard to see how one could
smuggle into American law the notion that convicts are human beings with
rights.50 The benefits of the experiment seem to me to be reasons not to
give up yet.
Their doubts about the regime have another implication. They provide
some reason to wonder about proposals to expand the scope of
accommodation even further—beyond religion to “conscience,” or “moral
liberty,” or something even broader.
Christopher L. Eisgruber and Lawrence G. Sager offer an exemplary
formulation of the objection to the privileging of religion: “religion does
not exhaust the commitments and passions that move human beings in deep
and valuable ways.”51 They claim that the state should “treat the deep,
religiously inspired concerns of minority religious believers with the same
regard as that enjoyed by the deep concerns of citizens generally.”52
But “deep” is not an administrable legal category. It is too vague for
that. Even if we know what we mean, we cannot always know it when we
see it. We are too opaque to one another, our depths are too personal and
idiosyncratic, for the state to know for certain which commitments and
passions really merit respect.53 That is why, Lupu and Tuttle observe,
reasoning by analogy between religious and nonreligious accommodations,
as Eisgruber and Sager propose, will not work.54
This is the most fundamental reason for protecting religious liberty
indirectly, under the description of more general rights (so that heresy, for
example, is protected as free speech). If there are going to be individual
accommodations, however, then they must be under some description, and
it is not clear that there is any good substitute here for “religion.”55 Even if
48
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what we want to protect is deep and valuable concerns, the law needs
workable proxies for this, and religion will almost certainly turn out to be
one of these.56 It is hard enough to determine when “religion” is present and
triggers heightened scrutiny. How do you plumb the depths of “deep”?
The desire to dispense with “religion” and instead accommodate all
deep and valuable human concerns, to create a world in which these are the
basis for a pervasive practice of exemptions from generally applicable
laws, is reminiscent of Herbert Marcuse’s suggestion in Eros and
Civilization that we should seek to abolish “surplus-repression,” repression
that exceeds the needs of civilization.57 Marcuse was thinking of sexual
repression, and the ideal of sexual liberation that he articulated in 1955 has
rocked our world. Parity for all deep and valuable concerns is an even more
radical ambition. Anyone who proposes it as a rule of law needs to reflect
on the implications of Lupu and Tuttle’s arguments. We are still learning
whether we can sustain any rule of accommodations from general laws.

researchers exemptions from drug laws in order to allow them to study controlled substances.” Id. It is
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